
In multiparty systems situations often arise in which various coalitions could form and each potential coalition must decide on how the gains from their joint action should be shared. We view these situations as multilateral bargaining problems, take into account how players’ opportunities in other coalitions should affect their disagreement payoffs, and the apply the Nash bargaining solution to determine how the gains from their joint action should be shared in each potential coalition.
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