This essay defends the theological agnostic’s view that one ought to withhold judgment concerning God’s existence, by offering a justification for that belief. A distinction is made between a strong agnostic, who believes it is impossible to know that God exists, and a weak agnostic, who just takes it to be a contingent fact about herself that she does not know whether or not God exists. The concept of God being used in this paper is that expressed by J.N. Findlay and Alvin Plantinga, who understand God as possessing its various qualities in some necessary manner. The paper proceeds by constructing an antinomy, according to which it follows from innocuous assertions both that God does exist and that God does not exist. Two distinct arguments are offered, with one deriving the existence of God, and the other deriving the nonexistence of God. Having described both arguments, the agnostic appeals to the Pyrrhonistic epistemic principle which says that if a proposition is counterbalanced, then with regard to that proposition one ought to withhold belief.