Having presented Husserl’s pre-transcendental position in Chap. 1, we may now turn our attention to his breakthrough to the transcendental and the initial stages of his transcendental period proper. We shall find, however, that this is no simple or straightforward matter. In this chapter, we begin by picking up where we left off in the closing pages of Chap. 1, exploring further Husserl’s own reservations with his first edition of the Logical Investigations. We then track the changes that he found necessary to make, following the first edition, in order to create and maintain a more coherent position relative to the non-psychological nature of the new science of phenomenology. Since these changes took place slowly and gradually in the development of Husserl’s thought, this chapter will only be concerned with the transition from Husserl’s early, pre-transcendental, position to the mature, transcendental period of the remainder of his works. We strive, in this chapter, to establish “an entirely new point of departure” for phenomenology, which will enable it to overcome the dangers of psychologism still lurking in the first edition of the Logical Investigations. Once we have been able to establish this point of departure, we then will be able, once again, to ask after the relationship obtained between our newly defined phenomenology and the psychology from which it is has now become more fully and definitively differentiated.