Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Sep 1999 Italy English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Research in Economics, volume 53, pages 247-273 (issn: 1090-9443,

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Authors: Battigalli P.; Siniscalchi M.;

doi: 10.1006/reec.1999.0201

handle: 11565/50249 , 1814/4462

Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability

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Abstract

Abstract We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 22 ) and is outcome-equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information.

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Italy

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Keywords

Explicability; Forward induction; Independence; Interactive epistemology; Rationalizability;

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