In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Revised version. Original dated to August 1996. The authors wish to thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of JEL for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant No. SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millennium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Published as Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J.O. (1998). Repeated implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), 308-317.

Published - sswp1027.pdf