A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Preprint 01 Nov 2001 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Games and Economic Behavior, volume 37, pages 259-294 (issn: 0899-8256,

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Authors: John Duggan; César Martinelli;

doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0843

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries

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Abstract

Individual votes in group decisions are here modeled on a framework of inference on parameters determining the distribution of received signals. It is proven that, as the size of the jury increase, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero unless unanimity is needed and the likelihood ratio is bounded. Conditions in terms of the ratio between hazard rates are also set.

Related Organizations

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Mexico
University of Rochester
United States

Keywords

voting rules, Condorce jury theorem, Applications of game theory, responsive cutoff equilibrium, Voting theory, Games in extensive form

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