The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Oct 2001 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Games and Economic Behavior, volume 37, pages 161-169 (issn: 0899-8256,

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Authors: Werner Güth; Steffen Huck; Wieland Müller;

doi: 10.1006/game.2000.0829

The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games

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Abstract

The authors investigate three mini ultimatum games, one similar to \textit{G. E. Bolton} and \textit{R. Zwick} [Games Econ. Behav. 10, 95-121 (1995; Zbl 0831.90137)] and two others in which equal split was replaced by nearly equal split, once slightly favoring the proposer and once slightly favoring the responder. Such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust. However, it was observed that behavior changes dramatically and fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits.

Related Organizations

University of London
United Kingdom
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Germany
Royal Holloway University of London
United Kingdom

Keywords

payoff, responder, Experimental studies, Games in extensive form, nearly equal split, ulimatum games, proposer

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