Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Jul 2001 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Games and Economic Behavior, volume 36, pages 74-103 (issn: 0899-8256,

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Authors: Ian L. Gale; Mark Stegeman;

doi: 10.1006/game.2000.0802

Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects

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Abstract

This paper studies the determination of price and market share in a market where well-informed duopolists or bid duopolists bid sequentially for the trade of a finite number of buyers and sellers. It is shown that the two buyers are most aggressive in bidding for the early units, regardless of the schedule of prizes. This paper generalizes the models of Gale and is an interesting one.

Related Organizations

Georgetown University
United States

Keywords

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, market structure, Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets), sequential auctions, Nash equilibrium

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