
handle: 10281/4403
The author considers a generalization of Nash equilibrium concept, where the players information about oponents behaviour becomes the crucial aspect for the notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium (CE) and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (RCE). It is a continuation of the article by \textit{A. Rubinstein} and \textit{A. Wolinsky} [Games Econ. Behav. 6, 299-311 (1994; Zbl 0790.90085)]. In this paper the author also argue for a refinement of RCE and show the wide applicability of this approach to the analysis of strategic situation.
Noncooperative games, teoria dei giochi, equilibrio, informazione, Games involving topology, set theory, or logic, conjectural equilibrium, strong rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
Noncooperative games, teoria dei giochi, equilibrio, informazione, Games involving topology, set theory, or logic, conjectural equilibrium, strong rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
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