Abstract Research Summary Managers draw on their informal networks of peers outside of their firm to better understand uncertain markets and help their firms adapt. This helps firms enhance their performance in information environments characterized by idiosyncratic and difficult‐to‐standardize soft information. However, in information environments characterized by standardized hard information, joint discussions facilitated by informal networks can make managers and their firms maladaptive towards uncertain markets. Based on the performance of two different categories of hedge funds during the 2008 financial crisis, we find that long–short funds, which heavily draw on soft information, performed better when embedded into networks of closely connected managers. In contrast, relative value funds, which heavily draw on hard information, performed better when their managers were more disconnected. Managerial Summary When are managers’ professional networks with peers in the industry valuable to the firm? We examined how hedge fund managers performed during the 2008 financial crisis to find out. When fund managers worked primarily with idiosyncratic and difficult‐to‐standardized soft information, we found that their networks helped them make sense of such information. In contrast, when fund managers worked primarily with quantified and codified hard information (e.g., financial statements and ratings), we found that their networks became echo chambers reinforcing similar opinions, which caused managers to fail to adapt quickly to the market crisis. Our findings counterintuitively suggest that funds using hard information may better off hiring relatively isolated managers who are not deeply tied to the industry.