Abstract Makadok has recently developed a mathematical model aimed at synthesizing the resource‐based and dynamic‐capabilities views of the rent creation process. One unstated implicit assumption in that model is that each bidding firm in the resource market is ignorant not only of the content of rival firms' private information, but also of the quality (i.e., the noisiness or reliability) of that information. Consequently, that model does not qualify as a rational‐expectations Bayesian Nash equilibrium—a fact that both generates questionable results (e.g., the possibility of negative expected profits) and impedes any effort to extend the model. The rational‐expectations critique in economics points out that this sort of nonrational assumption becomes increasingly implausible as economic actors learn more about each other's patterns over time through repeated interactions (in this case, as bidders repeatedly compete against each other to buy different resources over time). So, over the long run, the only truly stable, viable, and robust assumption would be rational‐expectations behavior. The primary purpose of this paper is to put Makadok's model on the firmer methodological footing of rational‐expectations Bayesian Nash equilibrium, so that it will no longer generate questionable results, and so that future researchers can more easily extend it. The secondary purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that this shift to rational‐expectations assumptions has little substantive impact on the testable hypotheses generated by Makadok's original model. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.