ABSTRACT To accelerate electric vehicle (EV) adoption and overcome the limitations of traditional EV charging—such as long charging time and lack of access to home chargers for urban residents—Battery as a Service (BaaS) has emerged as a promising alternative. Implementing the BaaS model requires investment and operation of battery swapping stations. As both EV manufacturers and battery producers venture into this domain, it raises the question: which party is better positioned to build and operate such infrastructure? We develop a game‐theoretical model with one battery supplier and one vehicle manufacturer to compare two BaaS operating models: “manufacturer‐operated” model (Model‐M) and “supplier‐operated” model (Model‐S), which differ fundamentally in supply chain structure. In the base model, Model‐S induces a larger number of battery swapping stations built. However, Model‐M entices more customers to adopt EVs and generates higher profits for the manufacturer. Interestingly, Model‐M may also be preferred by the supplier, despite requiring the supplier to cede some decision‐making authority. Extending the analysis to a setting with two competing EV manufacturers, we show that the relative efficiency between Model‐M and Model‐S depends on the degree of downstream competition. Specifically, Model‐M tends to be socially optimal in low‐competition environments, whereas Model‐S gains ground as competition intensifies. Finally, we show that as battery‐related costs account for a larger share of total network costs for each additional station built, Model‐S becomes the preferred structure for both the manufacturer and supplier over a larger range of parameters. Our paper offers insights for industry leaders and policymakers in determining which party should lead the effort of investing and operating the BaaS model.