
doi: 10.1002/cpe.70489
ABSTRACT Deploying defense strategies in dispersed computing consumes limited resources, a challenge exacerbated when nodes have only partial information about the system state. This article proposes a security defense strategy for dispersed computing based on Backward Mean Field Games. We first analyze the problem of limited node perception ability during attacks, and construct a backward stochastic differential equation to model the evolution of node resource states. We define an individual cost function intended to optimize resource consumption for the defense strategy. Then we find the optimal decentralized defense strategy and prove that it is ‐Nash equilibrium in the limit system. Finally, simulation experiments validate the strategy's effectiveness, demonstrating that the average system state rapidly stabilizes, and individual nodes robustly track this mean‐field trajectory toward their security targets, even under local attacks. These findings confirm that the strategy effectively guides nodes toward their terminal security targets, highlighting the strategy's good performance and robustness in balancing security needs against resource consumption.
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 0 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
