
Предложена теоретико-игровая модель рынка перевозок с двумя логистическими фирмами, использующими разную политику формирования цены выполнения заказа. Клиенты выбирают фирму для транспортировки товара, стараясь минимизировать общие издержки на осуществление перевозки, и представляют собой игроков в игре с полной информацией. Доказаны существование и единственность равновесия по Нэшу в данной игре. Найдена точка равновесия.
The model of two firms competition at logistic market is suggested. Two firms transporting goods for the customers are considered. Each firm define their own pricing scheme. Customers choose firm trying to minimize net value of service casualties. The game-theoretic approach used to find optimal behavior of customers considered as players. The existence of equilibrium is proved. The point of Nash equilibrium is found.
РЫНОК ПЕРЕВОЗОК, ЛОГИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИРМА, ИГРА С ПОЛНОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИЕЙ, РАВНОВЕСИЕ ПО НЭШУ, ОПТИМАЛЬНЫЕ СТРАТЕГИИ, COST OF FIRM'S CUSTOMER ORDER FULFILLMENT
РЫНОК ПЕРЕВОЗОК, ЛОГИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИРМА, ИГРА С ПОЛНОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИЕЙ, РАВНОВЕСИЕ ПО НЭШУ, ОПТИМАЛЬНЫЕ СТРАТЕГИИ, COST OF FIRM'S CUSTOMER ORDER FULFILLMENT
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