The main purpose of this article is to study the changes in Russian social policy in the past 18-20 years. The starting point is that social policy is a vague concept, by which a set of practical measures and theoretical approaches is being implied. One of the most important reasons to this is the theoretical instability of this concept is the general lack of positivism and determinism in social sciences and its failure to explain social changes. The processes of self-organization of population in Russia have been so many times interrupted by the state. The society already got used to being organized from above, however, in the last decades it seems that many major social groups as well as individuals have become rather confused and have lost their point of reference in the face of the state. The authorities, on the other hand, still do not interact with society, rather they are trying to influence it with usual strength. Different groups of population attempt to articulate their interests through the network of the NGOs, but the access barriers to any kind of discussion continue to be quite impenetrable. Redistribution mechanisms work badly, but these do not exhaust the essence of social policy. Thus, we still lack rational and attractive objectives of social development for the population. These, it seems, should most likely be related to improvement of education and health provision systems. According to its education component of HDI Russia was ranked 37th among the rest countries in 2010, while in the 1960s Russia (USSR) was in the top five of the most educated countries. The situation is far worse with the health of its population, according to its life expectancy modern Russia is far beyond many developed countries being ranked the 100th. And this with its policies offering the development of medical services rather than improving health per se. There is an apparent lack of understanding in the government with respect to the fact that the quality of life has become more important than wealth. Educated people in Russia appreciate interesting jobs and the freedom of choice, however, higher levels of economic differentiation among individuals, social groups and territories have become a serious constraint to pursuing any kind of reasonable professional motivation. No wonder, there is no consensus about the goals of development and ways of achieving them. There has also been a sharp decrease in employment in the last 15-18 years. The average number of employed at medium and large enterprises has decreased by more than one third according to official statistical data. At the same time the number of subsistence farmers and households has grown significantly, many people prefer not to buy, but to selfproduce vegetables, potatoes, fruits. About 1/3 of the adult population is involved in these kinds of activities during the peak season. This is to a greater extent possible because of flexible and irregular employment at enterprises. But the major motive behind such a strange employment model are low wages delivered at many Russian enterprises. Low wages and poor working conditions also remain the main cause of industrial conflict. But neither employees, nor any of their legal representatives such as trade unions are actually involved in the modern economic system. They have weak negotiation skills, while employers are not as constrained by state control and regulations as managers of Soviet enterprises. It is thus practically impossible for workers to organize any kind of strikes to defend their interests. Therefore, employees have to adhere to less efficient ways of attracting attention to their problems. The shift from universal to a minimum and goal-oriented social policy has led to unintended consequences in Russia. First, it has left a majority of population dissatisfied with its current situation (being used to continuous support from the state). Second, the state has itself created a trap, where pursuing economic goals through successful employment has become so much effort-consuming and risky that many decide to adhere to a much easier strategy of relying on state support. Thus, it has lead to an emergence of a rather massive, yet quite heterogeneous group of population, whose success is achieved through acquiring the nominal status of the ones in serious need and difficult situations. The now dominating approach to social policy adopted by the state is not just critically inefficient, it is, in fact, corrupting our population and assisting further lumpenisation, which can only be avoided through major revisions of social policy and adoption of serious measures, the explicit objectives of which should be consistent with purposes of human and social development.

В начале 1990-х годов российскому обществу представлялось, что пути социально-экономического развития России могут заметно трансформироваться. Научное сообщество вернулось к идее, что история не предопределена (как утверждал Герцен, «история стучится во все двери») и что советская социальная политика имеет многие возможные альтернативы. Это был классический спор об агентах/субъектах и структуре, спор, в сущности, о том, является ли история продуктом выбора индивидов или структурных сил. Эта дискуссия актуальна и по сей день, но уверенных в том, что Россия застряла в своей исторической колее, стало, пожалуй, больше. Однако критика основ социальной политики и попыток ее преобразования не может исходить из каких-то абстрактных соображений общего порядка, из примеривания того, что в Швеции или в США давно делают и там это хорошо получается. Критик должен быть, выражаясь словами Грамши или Уолцера, «связанным» (connected), то есть быть участником данного общества. Учитывая самобытность российского общества, это тем более важно. Задачей данной статьи является анализ изменений социальной политики в России за последние 18-20 лет.