Referring to a factual presentation of the circumstances of the Congress of German mo­narchs organised by Napoleon in Dresden in May 1812, the author attempts to describe the consequences of the event for the outcome of the Russian campaign and the overall European situation. The author concludes that the results of the Grand Dresden performance were in many ways opposite to the tasks that Napoleon defined and which, as it seemed to him, were successfully implemented. First, the meeting of the mo­narchs did not evoke awe in the Russian Emperor, but rather made him more assured in his wish to fight European invasion to the bitter end. Secondly, the strengthening of France’s allied relations with Austria and Prussia was in many ways only temporary and, to a certain extent, declarative. The delay in the Russian campaign and the absence of expected reports of the beginning of peace talks with the Russian Emperor dramatically changed the mood in Berlin and Vienna by the end of 1812. Thirdly, Napoleon’s illusion in relation to the positions of Turkey and Sweden in the forthcoming war with Russia not only remained but appear to have strengthened due to the seeming success of the Dresden events. Fourthly, Napoleon’s intentions to mislead the Russian court as regarded his true intentions did not bring the results he had expected. Moreover, they turned against him. Counting on a fleeting campaign, Napoleon repeatedly postponed the beginning of hostilities, which ultimately became one of the reasons for the defeat of the Grande Armée in 1812 in the conditions of a short warm season. Napoleon, starting with the Dresden meeting, was drawn into a trap that he himself, in many ways, had created. Increasingly blinded by the greatness of his power, he lost the ability to weigh his own capabilities, the probable actions of the enemy, the hesitant participants in the great European game, and objective natural and geographical factors.