Abstract The concept of bounded ethicality, introduced by Chugh et al. (2005) , complements that of bounded rationality by examining how individuals’ capacity to make ethical decisions is inherently constrained, leading to results systematically contradicting their own ethical standards. A key phenomenon that remains underexplored in this research is the tendency of individuals to underestimate the extent to which their own unethical behavior not only harms others but—more significantly—harms them. This blind spot reflects a form of myopia, as it pertains to the complex and far-reaching consequences of one’s actions. This article aims to specify the nature of this phenomenon, offer preliminary explanations, and discuss its broader implications for ethical decision-making in negotiations. Our argument is grounded in a qualitative, theory-building historical case study: the conflict surrounding the Lex Agraria in the late Roman Republic. We argue that unethical myopia is highly relevant for understanding how short-term gains from unethical actions obscure their long-term detrimental effects, and ultimately, it explains why such behavior is irrational. This insight holds not only for high-stakes negotiations but also for everyday situations in which individuals attempt to outsmart others. We also look at how the discussion on unethicality contributes to the discourse on the neglect of stakeholder interests in negotiations.