Nowadays, a bridge is being built between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy through phenomenology. This can be attributed to the fact that phenomenology and analytic philosophy are rooted in common questions, that their paths have crossed again and again in various ways throughout their historical development, and partly to the similarity of philosophical expectations. The article addresses the tidal relationship between the two philosophies through the question of "meaning" and tries to clarify the background of the cooperation that has emerged in the field of philosophy of mind in recent years. The first part confronts two philosophies, one centred on meaning and linguistic analysis, the other on the analysis of linguistic acts of consciousness in which meaning emerges, through the encounter between Frege and Husserl. The second part explains how in phenomenology meaning is conceived not only as something specific to linguistic acts, but also as something that is immanent to all acts of consciousness; and how this extension of the concept of meaning leads to an interpretation of intentionality inspired by analytic philosophy. The third and last part deals with the genetic relation that phenomenology assumes between linguistic meaning and the pre-linguistic sense constituted in our immediate experience. It also argues that a philosophy soleyl limited to linguistic analysis should be complemented by a theory of experience. Phenomenology, as a philosophy that describes the essential structures of the correlation between consciousness and the world as well as their genetic constitution, can undertake the task of presenting a theory of experience that precedes the question of linguistic meaning and can therefore complement a philosophy of language. This possible contribution of phenomenology is becoming more recognised in current debates in analytic philosophy of mind.