The presentation of a universal and ahistorical criterion has always been of interest to rationalists in order to rely on it to evaluate theories and to provide a criterion for distinguishing science from pseudo-science. This effort, which has so far yielded no results, has always been criticized by relativists. Relativists who see any reliance on the evaluation and adoption of scientific theories, including observations, as being influenced by social factors and political powers. Bhaskar, contrary to the rationalist approach, does not believe in a objective criterion for distinguishing science from pseudo-science, with a layered description of nature, makes the knowledge of the world conditional on purposeful and creative action with it. He considers scientific activity to be based on theorizing about the mechanisms of the underlying layers and to test them in the laboratory, and to defend the rationality of science with his own approach. In this article, we refer to the rationalist and relativist debate and explain Bhaskar's rational account of scientific activity. We will also argue that Bhaskar's description of scientific activity, his attention to the causal powers of things, and his special interest in experiment, have at their heart a methodological code called experimentation, which provides both a position against relativism and makes it possible to defend the possibility of scientific progress.