That which is possible is a constitutive part of human reality – as it is not least conspicuous in the experience of hope. Despite this conspicuousness, however, hope hardly appears as a phenomenon that easily lends itself to any clear-cut definition(s). In this chapter, I suggest a phenomenological depiction of the ways in which human possibilities are made present in the experience(s) of hope. This interpretation distinguishes between the temporal, the modal, and the ‘material’ features of hope. In terms of (i) temporality, every instance of hope must be thought of as always taking place in the present and predominantly directing itself towards the future. It is, however, also possible to hope into the present (e.g. ‘I hope you’re being honest’) as well as into the past (e.g. ‘I hope you did not lie’), wherefore the primary feature of hope cannot be said to consist in temporal futurity. Rather, the (ii) modality of possibility turns out to constitute a more essential aspect of every hopeful experience. Thus, hope is always directed towards events that are – to our knowledge – experienced as possible rather than fully actual, let alone necessary. Furthermore, the reality of hopeful possibility can neither be understood as logical possibility nor empirical probability. To explain the real character of the possibility of hope, I instead propose a distinction between possibilities in their different ‘material’ instantiations. The ‘how’ of the possibility of hope is hereby shown to depend on which existential sphere it is experienced within, which implies a distinction of Kierkegaard’s between the Aesthetic (i.e. the what of the hopeful experience), the Ethical (i.e. the normative how of the hopeful experience), and the Religious (i.e. the constitutive and complete unspecifiability of some of our hopeful experiences).