research product . 2002

Ownership, Competition, and Corruption : Bribe Takers versus Bribe Payers

Clarke, George R. G.; Xu, Lixin Colin;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Feb 2002
  • Publisher: World Bank, Washington, DC
  • Country: United States
Abstract
Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy. Using enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Easter Europe and Central Asia, the authors look at how characteristics of the firms paying bribes (such as ownership, profitability, and size) and characteristics of the utilities taking bribes (such as competition and utility capacity) affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. On the side o...
Subjects
free text keywords: ACCOUNTABILITY, BALANCE SHEET, BENCHMARKS, CIVIL SERVICE, COLLUSION, COMPETITION POLICY, CONSOLIDATION, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS, DECENTRALIZATION, ECONOMIC OUTCOMES, ENTERPRISE OWNERSHIP, EXCESS DEMAND, EXPORTS, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FOREIGN COMPETITION, GDP, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME LEVELS, INFLATION, MARGINAL COST, MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION, MONOPOLY RENTS, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, PENALTIES, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, PRIVATIZATION, PROFITABILITY, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUBLIC UTILITIES, RENT SEEKING, RISK PREMIUM, TAXATION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, UNEMPLOYMENT, URBANIZATION, UTILITIES, VOTERS
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