publication . Part of book or chapter of book . 2007

Recent developments in the theory of regulation

David E. M. Sappington; Mark Armstrong;
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  • Published: 06 Sep 2007
  • Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract
This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the regulated industry than do regulators. The discussion begins by characterizing the optimal regulation of a monopoly supplier that is better informed than the regulator about its production cost and/or consumer demand for its product. Both adverse selection ("hidden information") and moral hazard ("hidden action") complications are considered, as are the additional concerns that arise when the regulator's intertemporal commitment powers are limited. The chapter then analyzes the design...
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doi: 10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5
Subjects
ACM Computing Classification System: ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING
free text keywords: Monopoly, Economics, Information asymmetry, Moral hazard, Microeconomics, Yardstick, Regulated Industry, Bottleneck, Industrial organization, Adverse selection, Price-cap regulation
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Part of book or chapter of book
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s157...
Part of book or chapter of book . 2007
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