publication . Article . 2013

Coordination on Networks: Does Topology Matter?

Alberto Antonioni; Maria Paula Cacault; Rafael Lalive; Marco Tomassini;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Feb 2013 Journal: PLOS ONE, volume 8, issue 2, page e55033
Abstract
Effective coordination is key to many situations that affect the well-being of two or more humans. Social coordination can be studied in coordination games between individuals located on networks of contacts. We study the behavior of humans in the laboratory when they play the Stag Hunt game - a game that has a risky but socially efficient equilibrium and an inefficient but safe equilibrium. We contrast behavior on a cliquish network to behavior on a random network. The cliquish network is highly clustered and resembles more closely to actual social networks than the random network. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge ...
Persistent Identifiers
Subjects
free text keywords: Research Article, Computer Science, Computer Modeling, Mathematics, Topology, Medicine, Mental Health, Psychology, Behavior, Experimental Psychology, Social and Behavioral Sciences, Economics, Operations Research, Decision Analysis, Sociology, Social Networks, General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology, General Agricultural and Biological Sciences, General Medicine, Random graph, Laboratory results, Bioinformatics, Social network, business.industry, business, Cooperative behavior, Stag hunt, Game theory, Social coordination, Coordination game, Theoretical computer science, Physics, lcsh:Medicine, lcsh:R, lcsh:Science, lcsh:Q
Funded by
SNSF| Games, Networks, and Society
Project
  • Funder: Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF)
  • Project Code: 200021_132802
  • Funding stream: Project funding | Project funding (Div. I-III)
33 references, page 1 of 3

1 Vega-Redondo F (2003) Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

2 Goyal S (2007) Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

3 Jackson MO (2008) Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

4 Weidenholzer S (2010) Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game-theoretic literature. Games 1: 551–585. [OpenAIRE]

5 SzabóG, Fáth G (2007) Evolutionary games o n graphs. Physics Reports 446: 97–216.

6 Roca CP, Cuesta JA, Sánchez A (2009) Evolutionary game theory: temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics. Physics of Life Reviews 6: 208–249.20416850 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed]

7 KandoriM, Mailath G, Rob R (1993) Learning, mutation, and long-run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61: 29–56.

8 Young HP (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

9 Ellison G (1993) Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61: 1047–1071. [OpenAIRE]

10 Morris S (2000) Contagion. Review of Economic Studies 67: 1844–1849.

11 Camerer CF (2003) Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

12 Cassar A (2007) Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 58: 209–230.

13 My KB, Willinger M, Ziegelmeyer A (1999) Global versus local interaction in coordination games: an experimental investigation. Technical Report 9923,Working papers of BETA. ULP, Strasbourg.

14 Keser C, K-M-Erhart, Berninghaus S (1998) Coordination and local interaction: experimental evidence. Economics Letters 59: 269–275.

15 Berninghaus SK, Ehrhart KM, Keser C (2002) Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 39: 177–205. [OpenAIRE]

33 references, page 1 of 3
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue