publication . Part of book or chapter of book . Article . Other literature type . 2002

Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas

Michael W. Macy; Andreas Flache;
Open Access
  • Published: 14 May 2002
  • Publisher: Springer US
The Nash equilibrium, the main solution concept in analytical game theory, cannot make precise predictions about the outcome of repeated mixed-motive games. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players moves from one equilibrium to another. These limitations, along with concerns about the cognitive demands of forward-looking rationality, have motivated efforts to explore backward-looking alternatives to analytical game theory. Most of the effort has been invested in evolutionary models of population dynamics. We shift attention to a learning-theoretic alternative. Computational experiments with adaptive agents identify a fundamenta...
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: Colloquium Paper, Social dilemma, Solution concept, Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Prisoner's dilemma, Economics, Rationality, Microeconomics, Population, education.field_of_study, education, Equilibrium selection, Game theory
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Other literature type . 2002
Open Access
Part of book or chapter of book . 2012
Provider: NARCIS
Open Access
Part of book or chapter of book
Provider: UnpayWall
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