publication . Article . Preprint . 2011

The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Pedro Dal Bó; Guillaume R. Frechette;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2011 Journal: American Economic Review, volume 101, issue 1 February, pages 411-29
Abstract
1 For example, in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with patient agents, both cooperate and defect may be played in equilibrium. Even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain cooperation in a variety of environments, no definitive solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection: when both cooperation and defection are possible equilibrium outcomes, which one should we expect to prevail? Previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a specific equilibrium when they play a small number of infinitely repeated games: some subjects attempt to establish cooperative agreem...
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Subjects
free text keywords: Economics and Econometrics, Equilibrium selection, Cooperative Agreements, Mathematical economics, Repeated game, Dilemma, Economics
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