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International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality
Copyright policy )International Bailouts The IMF's role The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis. — Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Microsoft Academic Graph classification: Ex-ante Law and economics Conditionality Criticism International community Moral hazard Public policy Taxpayer Economics
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Economics and Econometrics
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Economics and Econometrics
Microsoft Academic Graph classification: Ex-ante Law and economics Conditionality Criticism International community Moral hazard Public policy Taxpayer Economics
- International Monetary Fund United States
Aylward, Lynn and Rupert Thorne (1998), “An Econometric Analysis of Countries’ Repayment Performance to the International Monetary Fund”, IMF Working Paper WP/98/32, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, March 1998. [OpenAIRE]
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1997), “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, document available from the BIS website, http://www.bis.org.
[Bolton, Patrick and Howard Rosenthal (1999), “Political Intervention in Debt Contracts: Moratoria and Bailouts”, draft, Princeton University.]
[Bordo, Michael D. (1998), “International Rescues Versus Bailouts: An Historical Perspective,” prepared for the Cato’s Institute’s 16th Annual Monetary Conference Money in the New Millenium: The Global Financial Architecture, Washington DC.]
Calomiris, Charles W. (1998), “The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort,” The Cato Journal 17 (3), pp. 275-294.
[Hutchcroft, P.D. (1998), Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.]
International Financial Institution Advisory Commision (2000). “Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission’, Allan H. Meltzer, Chairman, Washington DC, March (also referred to above as the “Meltzer Report”).
IMF (1998), Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF, Pamphlet 45, 1998, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (1999), Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries. The Enhanced HIPC Initiative, Pamphlet 51, 1999, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- International Monetary Fund United States
International Bailouts The IMF's role The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis. — Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer