publication . Article . Other literature type . Preprint . 2000

A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy

McCluskey, Jill J.; McCluskey, Jill J.;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2000 Journal: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, volume 29, pages 1-9 (issn: 1068-2805, eissn: 2372-2614, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
<jats:p>Demand for healthy, safe, and environmentally friendly food products has been increasing. In response, producers are marketing organic and other quality-differentiated foods, sometimes claiming to have followed sound environmental and animal welfare practices. These products frequently have unobservable quality attributes. If the profit-maximizing producer is able to deceive the consumer with a false claim, then he or she will enjoy a higher price with lower production costs (compared to the full disclosure outcome). The analysis described in this paper shows that repeat-purchase relationships and third-party monitoring are required for high-quality cred...
free text keywords: credence goods, organic foods., Agricultural and Food Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, L15, Q13,, Demand and Price Analysis,, Agronomy and Crop Science, Economics and Econometrics, Game theory, Environmentally friendly, Information asymmetry, Marketing, Animal welfare, Credence good, Game theoretic, Economics, Full disclosure, Unobservable, Agricultural and Food Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, credence goods, organic foods., Demand and Price Analysis

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