publication . Other literature type . Article . 2003

Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures

S. Trevis Certo;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jul 2003
  • Publisher: Academy of Management
I describe how board structures influence the decision-making processes that investors use when purchasing shares of firms undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs). IPO firms are relatively unknown to investors and suffer from a liability of market newness. I rely on signaling theory, institutional theory, and sociological research on prestige to suggest that investor perceptions of board prestige signal organizational legitimacy, thereby reducing the liability of market newness and improving IPO firm stock performance. I also propose that the characteristics of investors, namely prestige, influence their perceptions of board prestige.
free text keywords: Management of Technology and Innovation, Strategy and Management, General Business, Management and Accounting
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