publication . Preprint . External research report . 2012

Trade in Secondhand Goods, Monitoring of Illegal Trade, and Import Quotas on Legal Trade

東田, 啓作;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jun 2012
This paper examines the monitoring of illegal trade, and restrictions on the legal trade, of secondhand goods. We assume that the home (foreign) country exports (imports) secondhand goods both legally and illegally. We demonstrate that when the trade restriction is nonbinding, and part of the legally imported goods serve not as secondhand but as materials, an increase in the probability of monitoring may increase expected foreign environmental damage. In contrast, when the trade restriction is binding, if part of the legal imports is resold for material use, a stricter trade restriction decreases expected foreign environmental damage. We also demonstrate that wh...
free text keywords: hazardous wastes, monitoring, secondhand goods, trade restriction, jel:F13, jel:F18, jel:Q53
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External research report . 2012
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