Abstract Bruno Latour critiques the nature/culture binary, defining it as the fundamental dualism of modernity. To go beyond modernity, Latour proposes “nonmodernism,” the idea that the modern separation of nature and culture, along with its unavoidable anthropocentrism, never was ontologically valid to begin with. Nonmodern political philosophy takes all relations and objects seriously, without placing undue emphasis on human actions. While Latour never elaborated the nonmodern stance in great detail, Graham Harman, founder of object-oriented ontology, has pursued an elaboration of Latour’s nonmodernist project, albeit with important ontological differences. Harman takes Latour to task for placing excessive emphasis on relations. Harman holds that the inaccessible aspect of an object may be identified with substance. Harman claims that relationalist ontologies, because of their denial of objects underlying relations, cannot account for change. This article engages with Harman’s critique of Latour. While Harman correctly emphasizes that any genuinely nonmodern philosophy must go beyond a myopic focus on human power relations, this article argues that Harman is overly simplistic when equating the nonmodern possibility with substantialism alone. We may go beyond modern philosophy in a variety of ways, none of which have a monopoly on truth. Harman’s skepticism regarding knowledge can nonetheless correct certain technocratic tendencies within Latour’s political and social thought. The article’s concluding remarks engage with the new materialist scholar Arianne Françoise Conty’s critique of Latour’s Parliament of Things concept.