
The main purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of OPEC models and to link this evolution to some key events in the oil market. Our main conclusion is that OPEC’s pricing power varies over time. In many instances, OPEC can lose power to limit oil price movements in either direction. Such changes in pricing power are induced by market conditions and can occur in both weak and tight market conditions. Because of OPEC’s varying conduct, there is not a single model that fits OPEC behavior. Hence analysts have been forced to choose from a wide range of models to explain certain episodes. The empirical literature has not been successful in distinguishing between the various competing models, as these models offer very similar predictions.
OPEC, OPEC models, oil prices, pricing power, collusion, rent distribution, jel: jel:L11, jel: jel:Q40, jel: jel:Q30
OPEC, OPEC models, oil prices, pricing power, collusion, rent distribution, jel: jel:L11, jel: jel:Q40, jel: jel:Q30
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 43 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
