In a recent intervention in this Journal, Weintraub (1989) has argued that 'Methodology' has no consequences for economics and that the history of economic thought should be seen as the only vehicle by means of which appraisal might properly take place within economics. To most economists, the claims of either 'Methodology' or the history of economic thought may seem far removed from their professional concerns, and appeals to literary theory and pragmatist philosophy may further increase this distance. However, in spite of the apparently esoteric nature of Weintraub's argument, the issues raised are germane to the ways in which economic knowledge is understood. Some of the central debates in macroeconomics are adduced in the article as illustrations of its argument, and this is indicative of the degree to which it relates to areas of contemporary concerns in economics. Starting from similar presuppositions, this paper will examine Weintraub's article critically. Although sharing both a distrust of foundationalism and an enthusiasm for the history of economic thought, it will be argued that Weintraub's article develops an incoherent notion of the relation between metanarratives and economics, and one that is necessarily belied by its own argument. As a result, this paper will question Weintraub's conclusion that neither foundationalism nor antifoundationalism has any consequences for economics.