Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Preprint 01 Mar 1993Publisher:JSTORJournal:Econometrica, volume 61, page 303 (issn: 0012-9682,

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Authors: Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay;

doi: 10.2307/2951553

Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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Abstract

Summary: Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a connected subset of the Pareto efficient frontier. A simple sufficient condition for the latter to occur is also provided.

Keywords

renegotiation, Economic equilibrium, finitely repeated games, Multistage and repeated games, perfect equilibria

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