The issue of fiscal policy in a monetary union has once again become very topical, as the EU deadline for EMU approaches and as countries take seriously the need to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria but are by no means certain to succeed in attaining them by the time a first decision on participation is made. Moreover, Germany has thrown open the issue of whether the fiscal criteria are adequate to ensure the needed discipline, and has proposed more ambitious targets and monetary sanctions for non-compliance with the 3 % deficit ceiling. In this paper, I shall discuss what I consider to be the three essential issues with respect to fiscal policy and EMU: (i) the debt and deficit criteria as conditions for qualifying for EMU membership; (2) the need for fiscal discipline and policy coordination in EMU, and the role of the criteria in achieving them; and (3) the desirability of, and prospects for, creating a supranational fiscal authority in the EU to accompany monetary union. Naturally, these three issues have already achieved considerable attention in the literature, and I will not be able to do justice to that literature by providing a proper survey. Instead, I will provide my own views and be selective in my discussion of those of others.