Unbeatable Imitation
Copyright policy )Unbeatable Imitation
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent.
- Univerity of Heidelberg Germany
- University of California, Davis United States
- Department of Economics Switzerland
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Germany
- Department of Economics - University of Heidelberg Germany
imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games, FOS: Computer and information sciences, Computer Science - Machine Learning, 330, Imitationswettbewerb, Spieltheorie, imitate-the-best, potential games, Evolutionary Games, rock-paper-scissors, zero- sum games, finite population ESS, Machine Learning (cs.LG), C72, generalized ordinal potential, C73, ddc-330, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, zero-sum games, quasisupermodular games, games, Imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, generalized ordinal potential games, quasiconcave games, C72 - Noncooperative Games, aggregative games, learning, Evolutionary games, generalized ordinal potential games, Imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games, ddc:330, Imitate-the-best, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games, quasisubmodular games, quasiconcave games, D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, Repeated Games, Imitationsstrategie, 2-person games, 330 Economics, Imitate-the-best; learning; symmetric games; relative payoffs; zero- sum games., symmetric games, relative payoffs, Lernprozess, D43, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:C73
imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games, FOS: Computer and information sciences, Computer Science - Machine Learning, 330, Imitationswettbewerb, Spieltheorie, imitate-the-best, potential games, Evolutionary Games, rock-paper-scissors, zero- sum games, finite population ESS, Machine Learning (cs.LG), C72, generalized ordinal potential, C73, ddc-330, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, zero-sum games, quasisupermodular games, games, Imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, generalized ordinal potential games, quasiconcave games, C72 - Noncooperative Games, aggregative games, learning, Evolutionary games, generalized ordinal potential games, Imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games, ddc:330, Imitate-the-best, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games, quasisubmodular games, quasiconcave games, D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, Repeated Games, Imitationsstrategie, 2-person games, 330 Economics, Imitate-the-best; learning; symmetric games; relative payoffs; zero- sum games., symmetric games, relative payoffs, Lernprozess, D43, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:C73
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