The object of this paper is to point out the different interpretations to which the idea of naturalism (and naturalization) has given rise during the last two decades in the philosophy of language. Within Quine's conception of naturalized epistemology the author distinguishes a semantic thesis and an epistemological thesis. The consequences of Quine's semantic thesis are examined in the light of recent discussions concerning, (a) the externalism/internalism debate, and (b) the features of normativity and rationality, characteristic of linguistic activity, emphasized by Davidson and Dummett. The conclusion reached in this paper is that while it is doubtful whether Davidson's conception of meaning falls within the bounds of naturalized epistemology, Dummett's conception of language clearly does not. The conception of language as a natural object, put forward by Chomsky, is surveyed in the light of the two tenets of Quine's idea of naturalized epistemology and found irreconciliable with both