publication . Other literature type . Article . 2004

The Cost Effectiveness of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program Bonus Allocation Mechanism

Humei Wang; Richard J. Sexton;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 May 2004
  • Publisher: Wiley
Abstract
The U.S. Export Enhancement Program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism. The current mechanism resembles a discriminatory-price, common-value auction. However, auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons. This article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative, uniform-price auction. Estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the current format and simulations suggest that adopting a uniform-price auction format for bonus allocation may yield considerable savings to the Treasury by eliminating incentiv...
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ACM Computing Classification System: TheoryofComputation_GENERALTheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
free text keywords: Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous), Economics and Econometrics, Revenue equivalence, Industrial organization, Microeconomics, Dutch auction, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Economics, Auction theory, English auction, Vickrey auction, Reverse auction, Generalized second-price auction
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