
In an erasure adversarial wiretap channel (eAWTP-channel), the adversary can select a fraction ρr of the codeword to read, and a fraction ρe of the codeword to erase. The model can be seen as an extension of the wiretap II model where the adversary not only selects its view of the transmitted word, but also can erase a fraction of the codeword. eAWTP codes provide security and reliability for communication over eAWTP channels. We derive an upper bound on the rate of eAWTP codes, and give an efficient construction of a code family that achieves the bound, hence deriving secrecy capacity of the channel. We then show that the construction can also be used for AWTP channels in which instead of erasing code components, the adversary can add noise to the codeword. The construction is the only AWTP code with constant alphabet size.
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 4 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
