In our last chapter we seemed to have resolved one dilemma only to be faced with several new ones. Initially, we found a way through our impasse with respect to the genetic question of the Logical Investigations by differentiating between natural and philosophical sciences and holding that phenomenology, as a philosophical discipline, would be interested in cognition only as an ideal possibility, rather than as an event in Nature. Genetic naturalistic explanation could then be considered to be inappropriate in phenomenology, since phenomenology would now be defined as a non-natural discipline. Once we make such a distinction between phenomenology as a philosophical science, and psychology as a natural science, the question arises as to how phenomenology is to understand the nature of its subject matter as different from that of psychology. In “The Idea of Phenomenology” lectures, Husserl simply stated that in order to study consciousness phenomenologically, we must suspend our natural psychological apperception with respect to it. We wondered at the time, however, how such a suspension could be justified. Granted that we wish to study the possibility of cognition as an ideal possibility, do we not still understand this possibility to be a human possibility? Would we, once again, simply be ignoring, temporarily, a connection that does, in essence, exist? It is here that things became problematic.