publication . Article . Part of book or chapter of book . Other literature type . 2002

Learning dynamics in social dilemmas

Macy, MW; Flache, A; Macy, Michael W.;
Open Access English
  • Published: 14 May 2002 Journal: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, volume 99, issue 3, pages 7,229-7,236 (issn: 0027-8424, Copyright policy)
Abstract
The Nash equilibrium, the main solution concept in analytical game theory, cannot make precise predictions about the outcome of repeated mixed-motive games. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players moves from one equilibrium to another. These limitations, along with concerns about the cognitive demands of forward-looking rationality, have motivated efforts to explore backward-looking alternatives to analytical game theory. Most of the effort has been invested in evolutionary models of population dynamics. We shift attention to a learning-theoretic alternative. Computational experiments with adaptive agents identify a fundamenta...
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: PRISONERS-DILEMMA, GAMES, STRATEGY, Colloquium Paper, Social dilemma, Solution concept, Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Prisoner's dilemma, Economics, Rationality, Microeconomics, Population, education.field_of_study, education, Equilibrium selection, Game theory
Related Organizations
Funded by
NSF| Identity, Trust, and Cooperation: Web-based Experiments in the United States and Japan
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0079381
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
,
NSF| Collective Action in Exchange Networks; Coalitions, Identity, and Interest
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 9819249
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
Open Access
https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/6...
Part of book or chapter of book
Provider: UnpayWall
Open Access
NARCIS
Part of book or chapter of book . 2012
Provider: NARCIS
23 references, page 1 of 2

1. Dawes, R. M. (1980) Annu. Rev. Psychol. 31, 169-193.

2. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA).

3. Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1991) Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

4. Simon, H. (1992) in Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models, ed. Zey, M. (Sage, Newbury Park, CA), pp. 32-53.

5. Binmore, K. G. & Samuelson, L. (1992) J. Econ. Theory 57, 278-305.

6. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

7. Weibull, J. W. (1998) Eur. Econ. Rev. 42, 641-649.

8. Boyd, R. & Lorderbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59.

9. Roth, A. E. & Erev, I. (1995) Games Econ. Behav. 8, 164-212.

10. Macy, M. W. (1991) Am. J. Soc. 97, 808-843.

11. James, W. (1981) Principles of Psychology (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA).

12. Thorndike, E. L. (1898) Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals (MacMillan, New York).

13. Rummelhart, D. E. & McLell, J. L. (1988) Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

14. Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. (1965) Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Michigan Univ. Press, Ann Arbor).

15. Erev, I. & Roth, A. E. (1998) Am. Econ. Rev. 88, 848-879.

23 references, page 1 of 2
Abstract
The Nash equilibrium, the main solution concept in analytical game theory, cannot make precise predictions about the outcome of repeated mixed-motive games. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players moves from one equilibrium to another. These limitations, along with concerns about the cognitive demands of forward-looking rationality, have motivated efforts to explore backward-looking alternatives to analytical game theory. Most of the effort has been invested in evolutionary models of population dynamics. We shift attention to a learning-theoretic alternative. Computational experiments with adaptive agents identify a fundamenta...
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: PRISONERS-DILEMMA, GAMES, STRATEGY, Colloquium Paper, Social dilemma, Solution concept, Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Prisoner's dilemma, Economics, Rationality, Microeconomics, Population, education.field_of_study, education, Equilibrium selection, Game theory
Related Organizations
Funded by
NSF| Identity, Trust, and Cooperation: Web-based Experiments in the United States and Japan
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0079381
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
,
NSF| Collective Action in Exchange Networks; Coalitions, Identity, and Interest
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 9819249
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
Open Access
https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/6...
Part of book or chapter of book
Provider: UnpayWall
Open Access
NARCIS
Part of book or chapter of book . 2012
Provider: NARCIS
23 references, page 1 of 2

1. Dawes, R. M. (1980) Annu. Rev. Psychol. 31, 169-193.

2. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA).

3. Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1991) Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

4. Simon, H. (1992) in Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models, ed. Zey, M. (Sage, Newbury Park, CA), pp. 32-53.

5. Binmore, K. G. & Samuelson, L. (1992) J. Econ. Theory 57, 278-305.

6. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

7. Weibull, J. W. (1998) Eur. Econ. Rev. 42, 641-649.

8. Boyd, R. & Lorderbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59.

9. Roth, A. E. & Erev, I. (1995) Games Econ. Behav. 8, 164-212.

10. Macy, M. W. (1991) Am. J. Soc. 97, 808-843.

11. James, W. (1981) Principles of Psychology (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA).

12. Thorndike, E. L. (1898) Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals (MacMillan, New York).

13. Rummelhart, D. E. & McLell, J. L. (1988) Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

14. Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. (1965) Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Michigan Univ. Press, Ann Arbor).

15. Erev, I. & Roth, A. E. (1998) Am. Econ. Rev. 88, 848-879.

23 references, page 1 of 2
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