descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Preprint 01 Aug 1993 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Journal of Economic Theory, volume 60, pages 217-240 (issn: 0022-0531,

Authors: Abrea, Dilip; Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio;

doi: 10.1006/jeth.1993.1042

handle: 2027.42/30655

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games

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Abstract

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Keywords

equal bargaining power, Economics, symmetric repeated games, renegotiation-proofness, strongly symmetric solutions, infinitely repeated games, Multistage and repeated games, Business, consistent bargaining equilibria, Repeated games, negotiation, bargaining theory, symmetric game, monitoring

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