The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms

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Makowsky, Michael; Smaldino, Paul;

We consider a model of multilevel selection and the evolution of institutions that distribute power in the form of influence in a group's collective interactions with other groups. In the absence of direct group-level interactions, groups with the most cooperative membe... View more
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