publication . Article . 1996

Careerism, Committee Assignments and the Electoral Connection

Jonathan Katz; Sala, Br;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Mar 1996
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
  • Country: United States
Abstract
<jats:p>Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment “property rights.” We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system—the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the ea...
Subjects
free text keywords: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science, Property rights, Law and economics, Norm (social), Political economy, Incentive, Ballot, Economics, Secret ballot, Redistribution (election)
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publication . Article . 1996

Careerism, Committee Assignments and the Electoral Connection

Jonathan Katz; Sala, Br;