Subject: Quantitative Finance - Pricing of Securities | Economics - General Economics | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
In an economy with asymmetric information, the smart contract in the blockchain protocol mitigates uncertainty. Since, as a new trading platform, the blockchain triggers segmentation of market and differentiation of agents in both the sell and buy sides of the market, i... View more
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If f f2 or p > 1/2, then DB > 0 for all q 2 (q0, 1], and vB is monotonically increasing. On the other hand, if p and f > f2, then there is a unique q such that DB ? 0 , q ? q . Welfare of sellers with non-lemons is