publication . Preprint . 2017

Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using Signaling Games with Evidence

Pawlick, Jeffrey; Zhu, Quanyan;
Open Access English
  • Published: 25 Jul 2017
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. In this paper, we investigate a model of signaling games in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability. This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. Then we illustrate these analytical results with an application to active ...
acm: ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Download from

[1] Vincent P Crawford and Joel Sobel. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: J of the Econometric Soc., pages 1431-1451, 1982.

[2] Jason Franklin, Mark Luk, Jonathan M McCune, Arvind Seshadri, Adrian Perrig, and Leendert Van Doorn. Remote detection of virtual machine monitors with fuzzy benchmarking. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Rev., 42(3):83-92, 2008.

[3] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game theory. 1991, volume 393. 1991.

[4] R. D. McKelvey, A. M. McLennan, and T. L. Turocy. Gambit: Software tools for game theory, ver. 14.1.0. [Online]. Available:

[5] Myle Ott, Yejin Choi, Claire Cardie, and Jeffrey T Hancock. Finding deceptive opinion spam by any stretch of the imagination. In Proc. 49th Annual Meeting Assoc. for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, pages 309-319, 2011. [OpenAIRE]

[6] Jeffrey Pawlick and Quanyan Zhu. Deception by design: Evidence-based signaling games for network defense. In Workshop on the Econ. of Inform. Security, Delft, The Netherlands, 2015. [OpenAIRE]

[7] Hossein Siadati, Bahador Saket, and Nasir Memon. Detecting malicious logins in enterprise networks using visualization. In IEEE Symp. Visualization for Cyber Security (VizSec), pages 1-8, 2016.

[8] Frank J. Stech, Kristin E. Heckman, and Blake E. Strom. Integrating cyber-D&D into adversary modeling for active cyber defense. In Cyber Deception, pages 169-201. Springer, 2016.

[9] Michail Tsikerdekis. Identity deception prevention using common contribution network data. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12(1):188-199, 2017.

Powered by OpenAIRE Open Research Graph
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue