publication . Preprint . 2002

Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices

Gottesman, Daniel; Lo, Hoi-Kwong; Lütkenhaus, Norbert; Preskill, John;
Open Access English
  • Published: 10 Dec 2002
Abstract
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
Subjects
arxiv: Computer Science::Cryptography and SecurityPhysics::Instrumentation and DetectorsQuantum Physics
Funded by
NSF| ITR: Institute for Quantum Information
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0086038
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering | Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
,
NSERC
Project
  • Funder: Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
Download from
33 references, page 1 of 3

[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.

[2] D. Mayers, “Quantum key distribution and string oblivious transfer in noisy channels,” in Advances in Cryptography-Proceedings of Crypto'96 (SpringerVerlag, New York, 1996), pp. 343-357; “Unconditional security in quantum cryptography,” J. Assoc. Comp. Mach. 48, 351 (2001), arXiv:quant-ph/9802025. [OpenAIRE]

[3] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances,” Science 283, 2050-2056 (1999), arXiv:quantph/9803006.

[4] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P. O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roychowdhury, “A proof of the security of quantum key distribution,” in Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (ACM Press, New York, 2000), pp. 715-724, arXiv:quant-ph/9912053.

[5] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441-444 (2000), arXiv:quantph/0003004. [OpenAIRE]

[6] M. Koashi and J. Preskill, “Secure quantum key distribution with an uncharacterized source,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902 (2003), arXiv:quant-ph/0208155 (2002). [OpenAIRE]

[7] D. Mayers and A. Yao, “Quantum cryptography with imperfect apparatus,” arXiv:quant-ph/9809039 (1998); D. Mayers and A. Yao, “Self testing quantum apparatus,” arXiv:quant-ph/0307205. [OpenAIRE]

[8] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus and D. Mayers, “Unconditional security of practical quantum key distribution,” arXiv:quant-ph/0107017 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

[9] B. A. Slutsky, R. Rao, P.-C. Sun, and Y. Fainman, “Security of quantum cryptography against individual attacks,” Phys. Rev. A 57, 2383-2398 (1998).

[10] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000), arXiv:quant-ph/9910093.

[11] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, “Security aspects of practical quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330-1333 (2000), arXiv:quantph/9911054.

[12] S. Felix, N. Gisin, A. Stefanov, H. Zbinden, “Faint laser quantum key distribution: Eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses,” J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2009 (2001), arXiv:quant-ph/0102062. [OpenAIRE]

[13] G. Gilbert and M. Hamrick, “Practical quantum cryptography: a comprehensive analysis (part one),” arXiv:quant-ph/0009027 (2000). [OpenAIRE]

[14] G. Gilbert and M. Hamrick, “Secrecy, computational loads and rates in practical quantum cryptography,” Algorithmica 34, 314-339 (2002), arXiv:quant-ph/0106043 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

[15] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, “Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communications,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory 49, 457 (2003), arXiv:quant-ph/0105121 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

33 references, page 1 of 3
Abstract
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
Subjects
arxiv: Computer Science::Cryptography and SecurityPhysics::Instrumentation and DetectorsQuantum Physics
Funded by
NSF| ITR: Institute for Quantum Information
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0086038
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering | Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
,
NSERC
Project
  • Funder: Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
Download from
33 references, page 1 of 3

[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.

[2] D. Mayers, “Quantum key distribution and string oblivious transfer in noisy channels,” in Advances in Cryptography-Proceedings of Crypto'96 (SpringerVerlag, New York, 1996), pp. 343-357; “Unconditional security in quantum cryptography,” J. Assoc. Comp. Mach. 48, 351 (2001), arXiv:quant-ph/9802025. [OpenAIRE]

[3] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances,” Science 283, 2050-2056 (1999), arXiv:quantph/9803006.

[4] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P. O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roychowdhury, “A proof of the security of quantum key distribution,” in Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (ACM Press, New York, 2000), pp. 715-724, arXiv:quant-ph/9912053.

[5] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441-444 (2000), arXiv:quantph/0003004. [OpenAIRE]

[6] M. Koashi and J. Preskill, “Secure quantum key distribution with an uncharacterized source,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902 (2003), arXiv:quant-ph/0208155 (2002). [OpenAIRE]

[7] D. Mayers and A. Yao, “Quantum cryptography with imperfect apparatus,” arXiv:quant-ph/9809039 (1998); D. Mayers and A. Yao, “Self testing quantum apparatus,” arXiv:quant-ph/0307205. [OpenAIRE]

[8] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus and D. Mayers, “Unconditional security of practical quantum key distribution,” arXiv:quant-ph/0107017 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

[9] B. A. Slutsky, R. Rao, P.-C. Sun, and Y. Fainman, “Security of quantum cryptography against individual attacks,” Phys. Rev. A 57, 2383-2398 (1998).

[10] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000), arXiv:quant-ph/9910093.

[11] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, “Security aspects of practical quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330-1333 (2000), arXiv:quantph/9911054.

[12] S. Felix, N. Gisin, A. Stefanov, H. Zbinden, “Faint laser quantum key distribution: Eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses,” J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2009 (2001), arXiv:quant-ph/0102062. [OpenAIRE]

[13] G. Gilbert and M. Hamrick, “Practical quantum cryptography: a comprehensive analysis (part one),” arXiv:quant-ph/0009027 (2000). [OpenAIRE]

[14] G. Gilbert and M. Hamrick, “Secrecy, computational loads and rates in practical quantum cryptography,” Algorithmica 34, 314-339 (2002), arXiv:quant-ph/0106043 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

[15] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, “Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communications,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory 49, 457 (2003), arXiv:quant-ph/0105121 (2001). [OpenAIRE]

33 references, page 1 of 3
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