publication . Preprint . Article . 2003

A renormalization group theory of cultural evolution

Gábor Fáth; Miklos Sarvary;
Open Access English
  • Published: 30 Dec 2003
Abstract
We present a theory of cultural evolution based upon a renormalization group scheme. We consider rational but cognitively limited agents who optimize their decision making process by iteratively updating and refining the mental representation of their natural and social environment. These representations are built around the most important degrees of freedom of their world. Cultural coherence among agents is defined as the overlap of mental representations and is characterized using an adequate order parameter. As the importance of social interactions increases or agents become more intelligent, we observe and quantify a series of dynamic phase transitions by wh...
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doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.09.043
Subjects
free text keywords: Nonlinear Sciences - Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems, Condensed Matter - Statistical Mechanics, Physics - Physics and Society, Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution, Statistics and Probability, Condensed Matter Physics, Mathematics, Sociocultural evolution, Renormalization group, Coherence (physics), Cognitive psychology, Phase transition, Social environment, Mental representation
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