Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

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Pini, Maria; Rossi, Francesca; Venable, Brent; Walsh, Toby;
  • Subject: Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence | Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory | I.2.4

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospital... View more
  • References (25)
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