publication . Preprint . Article . 2009

Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

Maria Silvia Pini; Francesca Rossi; K. Brent Venable; Toby Walsh;
Open Access English
  • Published: 24 Sep 2009
Abstract
Comment: 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009), Budapest, Hungary, May 10-15, 2009, Volume 1
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, I.2.4, Artificial Intelligence, Computational social choice, Algorithm, Machine learning, computer.software_genre, computer, Stable roommates problem, Voting, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Stable marriage problem, Voting theory, Theoretical computer science, Time complexity, Computer science, Gender neutrality, business.industry, business
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publication . Preprint . Article . 2009

Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

Maria Silvia Pini; Francesca Rossi; K. Brent Venable; Toby Walsh;