publication . Preprint . 2018

BEBP: An Poisoning Method Against Machine Learning Based IDSs

Li, Pan; Liu, Qiang; Zhao, Wentao; Wang, Dongxu; Wang, Siqi;
Open Access English
  • Published: 11 Mar 2018
In big data era, machine learning is one of fundamental techniques in intrusion detection systems (IDSs). However, practical IDSs generally update their decision module by feeding new data then retraining learning models in a periodical way. Hence, some attacks that comprise the data for training or testing classifiers significantly challenge the detecting capability of machine learning-based IDSs. Poisoning attack, which is one of the most recognized security threats towards machine learning-based IDSs, injects some adversarial samples into the training phase, inducing data drifting of training data and a significant performance decrease of target IDSs over tes...
free text keywords: Statistics - Machine Learning, Computer Science - Learning, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
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