publication . Preprint . 2019

The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Elections

Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.; Rothe, Joerg;
Open Access English
  • Published: 19 Jun 2019
Abstract
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a use-it-or-lose-it moment to decide whether to bribe/alter a given vote, and at the time of making that decision, the briber may not know what votes remaining voters are planning on casting. In this paper, we introduce a model for, and initiate the study of, bribery in such an online, sequential setting. We show that even for election systems whose winner-determination problem is polynomi...
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Computer Science - Computational Complexity, Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
Related Organizations
Funded by
NSF| Automated Feedback in Undergraduate Computing Theory Courses
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 1819546
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Education & Human Resources | Division of Undergraduate Education
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